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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Santiago R. Burrola appeals from the district court's order denying his Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. Mr. Burrola contends that the Idaho 
Supreme Court violated his due process and equal protection rights when it refused to 
augment the record with the transcript of the sentencing hearing that took place on 
September 8, 2008, despite the fact that the grounds of the appeal demonstrate a 
colorable need for the inclusion of the transcript. Further, Mr. Burrola contends that the 
district court abused its discretion when it did not consider additional information 
provided by Mr. Burrola in his Second Addendum to his Rule 35 motion. Finally, 
Mr. Burrola contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 
motion. 
Mr. Burrola requests that this Court grant him access to the requested transcript 
and allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing once the record is complete. 
Should this Court deny Mr. Burrola's request for the sentencing transcript, Mr. Burrola 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order denying 
Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion and remand the case to the district court for a new 
sentencing hearing with an order to consider the supplemental information in its Rule 35 
determination, or, alternatively, reduce Mr. Burrola's sentence as it deems appropriate. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On April 5, 2008, Mr. Burrola slapped his girlfriend during an altercation. 
(R., pp.32-33.) He pleaded guilty to Domestic Violence in the Presence of Children. 
(R., pp.58-64.) The district court accepted Mr. Burrola's guilty plea and sentenced him 
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to 10 years, with 2 years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., p.69.) On February 11, 
2009, following a successful rider, the court placed Mr. Burrola on probation. 
(R., pp.78-81.) On December 27, 2011, Mr. Burrola admitted to violating his probation 
by not attending his classes, not obeying his probation officer's order to not engage in a 
sexual relationship or spend time with any parolees or probationers, and using 
marijuana. (R., pp.111-114, 116.) On January 11, 2012, the court revoked 
Mr. Burrola's probation, but then reinstated probation. (R., pp.118-120.) On 
December 18, 2012, Mr. Burrola admitted to violating his probation by failing to 
complete his aftercare program, possessing alcohol, and absconding from probation. 
(R., pp.124-127, 140.) On January 29, 3013, the court revoked Mr. Burrola's probation 
and executed the original sentence of 10 years, with 2 years fixed. (R., pp.142-144.) 
On February 1, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 for a 
reduction of sentence and requested leave to file supplemental information. 
(R., pp.145-146.) On February 4, 2013, the court filed a notice of intent to rule on the 
Rule 35 motion on or about February 12, 2014. (R., pp.147-148.) On February 5, 2014, 
Mr. Burrola filed an Addendum to his Rule 35 motion that included positive progress 
reports from his Pathways domestic violence counseling program. (R., pp.149-162.) 
On February 14, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a Motion to Enlarge Time so that he could file 
additional documentation in support of his Rule 35 motion that would not be available 
for approximately six weeks. (R., pp.163-134.) The court granted in part and denied in 
part the Motion to Enlarge Time, giving Mr. Burrola until February 22, 2013 to provide 
additional information, stating it would make a ruling on or after that date. (R., pp.165-
167.) However, the court did not rule on the Rule 35 motion on or around February 22, 
2013. On July 19, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a Second Addendum to his rule 35 motion, 
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providing three letters of support from his family members and a letter from Collin 
Young, an IDOC addictions treatment counselor, explaining that Mr. Burrola was 
enrolled in Anger Management, Partners in Parenting, Getting Motivated to Change, 
and was on the waiting list for Therapeutic Community. (R., pp.168-176.) On July 26, 
2013, the court denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion, stating that it did not consider the 
information provided in Mr. Burrola's Second Addendum to his Rule 35 motion because 
it was not filed prior to February 22, 2013. (R., pp.177-179.) Mr. Burrola timely 
appealed from the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.180-182.) 
On December 26, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a Motion to Augment the Record to 
include the transcripts of the original sentencing hearing that occurred on September 3, 
2008 and a subsequent disposition hearing. 1 (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment.))2 
In his Motion to Augment, Mr. Burrola stated that the sentencing hearing transcript was 
necessary to complete the record because Mr. Burrola made a statement at this hearing 
that the court when considered it imposed the original sentence. (Motion to Augment, 
pp.2-4.) Mr. Burrola further stated that the minute order from the sentencing hearing 
was insufficient to establish an adequate record because it only stated that Mr. Burrola 
made "comments" following counsel's sentencing recommendations. (Motion to 
Augment, p.3, R., p.141.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Burrola's Motion to 
1 Mr. Burrola is not challenging the denial of his request for the transcript of the 
dispositional hearing held on January 29, 2013 in this appeal. 
2 The Motion to Augment the Record to include the Motion to Augment and to Suspend 
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof has been filed 
contemporaneously with this brief. 
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Augment on January 31, 2014. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment.)3 
3 The Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule has 
been filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court violate Mr. Burrola's rights to due process and 
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record with the 
September 3, 2008 sentencing hearing transcript that is necessary for appellate 
review of his Rule 35 motion? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it refused to consider 
supplemental information provided by Mr. Burrola in his Second Addendum to his 
Rule 35 motion? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 
motion in light of the supplemental information provided in his original Addendum 
to his Rule 35 motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Mr. Burrola's Rights To Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The September 3, 
2008 Sentencing Transcript That Is Necessary For Appellate Review Of His Rule 35 
Motion 
In order to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion, Mr. Burrola must show that the sentence was "excessive 
in view of new or additional information presented with his motion for reduction." 
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117 (Ct. App. 1991). The phrase "new or additional 
information" naturally begs the question of to what prior information the information is 
new or additional. While most of the information considered by the sentencing court is 
available in the record, such as the PSI and any attached documents, any testimony 
presented at the sentencing hearing would not be in the record unless it is stated in the 
minute order. As such, if the minute order shows that testimony was presented by the 
defendant, victim, or other witnesses without providing information about the content of 
the testimony, a transcript is necessary to provide the reviewing court with an adequate 
record on appeal. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered circumstances under which 
indigent defendants are entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. 
State v. Brunet, _ Idaho _, 2013 WL 6001894 (2013), reh'g denied. The Court 
recognized that there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to 
provide transcripts sufficient for an adequate appellate review. See id. ( citing 
Mayerv. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 
462 (2002)). These requirements are part of the guarantees in the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall 
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have due process and equal protection under the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 13. Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be 
"fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991). Those same standards have been 
applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of 
Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed, in the context of due process 
and equal protection, the question of whether transcripts must be provided to indigent 
defendants. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956); 
Draperv. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer, supra, 404 U.S. at 195. 
The United States Supreme Court determined that if a state chooses to provide a 
process for granting appellate review, the requirements of due process and equal 
protection apply. Griffin, supra, 351 U.S. at 18. It follows, therefore, that if a state 
provides its citizens with an appellate process, it must also provide indigent defendants 
with the tools necessary to establish a proper appellate record. By not doing so, the 
court is depriving an indigent defendant of his right to an effective appeal. See Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to 
prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") (emphasis added). 
In Idaho, the requirement that the court must provide an indigent defendant with 
the transcripts necessary to establish an adequate record on appeal is further justified 
by the fact that items missing from the record on appeal are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court. State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also 
State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 751, 805 (2000) (applying this presumption in absence of a 
complete record). Therefore, if a defendant does not provide the appellate court with 
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the transcripts necessary to review his claim, the missing record will be presumed to 
support the court's decision that is being challenged on appeal. It would be illogical for 
the Court to place an appellant in such an obvious catch-22 by denying him access to 
the transcripts that support his position, then finding that the absence of the transcripts 
creates a presumption that the transcripts would not support his position. It is clear, 
therefore, that a court must provide the transcripts necessary for an indigent defendant 
to launch an effective appeal. The only question remaining is the standard for 
determining what transcripts are necessary for establishing an adequate record. 
Given this landscape, the Idaho Supreme Court in Brunet held that, in order to 
show that the transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the 
party moving for its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the 
additional transcripts." Brunet, supra, _Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894. The Court 
reasoned that a defendant's right to an adequate record did not extend to "fishing 
expeditions" and "mere speculation or hope that something exists does not amount to 
the appearance or semblance of specific information necessary to establish a colorable 
need." Id (paraphrasing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 211 (1970) ("in 
legal usage, the word 'color,' as in 'color of authority,' 'color of law,' 'color of office,' 
'color of title,' and 'colorable,' suggests a kind of holding out and means 'appearance, 
semblance, or simulacrum,' but not necessarily the reality"). 
Here, the facts regarding the request for the sentencing transcript can be 
distinguished from those in Brunet. In Brunet, the Court held that the defendant "failed 
to demonstrate a colorable need for those requested transcripts in light of the contents 
of the existing record on appeal." Brunet, supra, _ Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894. 
The Court further determined that the defendant in Brunet had not stated what specific 
8 
information was relevant to his appeal and, rather, "articulated a desire to procure the 
transcripts to then search the transcripts for a reason to request and incorporate the 
transcripts in the first place." Id. In contrast, Mr. Burrola specifically stated not only the 
reason why he requires the information contained in the sentencing transcript, but also 
why the existing record is insufficient to provide this information. (Motion to Augment, 
p.3.) In his Motion to Augment, Mr. Burrola clearly stated that the subject of his appeal 
was the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (Motion to Augment, p.2.) As discussed above, in 
order to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's 
Rule 35 motion, Mr. Burrola must show that the sentence was "excessive in view of new 
or additional information presented with his motion for reduction." Hernandez, supra, 
121 Idaho at 117. Since the sentence to which Mr. Burrola is objecting is the sentence 
that was imposed at the sentencing hearing, the information presented in his Rule 35 
motion must be new or additional to the information that was presented at the original 
sentencing hearing. The information at the original sentencing hearing would, of 
course, include the PSI and its accompanying information, any additional documents 
provided to the court at the hearing, and any testimony provided by the victim, 
Mr. Burrola, or any other witnesses at the hearing. While the arguments of counsel, 
unless they provide new information, would not constitute evidence, the testimony of a 
defendant at sentencing is evidence that the court must consider. See State v. Gervasi, 
138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003) (determining that when a defendant makes a 
statement of allocution at a sentencing hearing, those comments are relevant to the 
sentencing determination), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 
882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. 
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The statement made by Mr. Burrola at his sentencing hearing is only articulated 
in two places: the minute order and the reporter's transcript. Had the minute order from 
the sentencing hearing stated that no testimony or additional information was provided, 
a transcript might not be necessary. Had the minute order shown redundancy - e.g. 
"defendant read his statement verbatim from the PSI" - the transcript might not be 
necessary. However, the minute order states that Mr. Burrola made "comments." 
(R., p.141.) The word "comments" certainly does not convey the testimony that was 
presented by Mr. Burrola at his sentencing hearing and the State has not established 
that there is an alternative option for determining what was said, as is its burden. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971) (holding that "where the grounds of 
appeal [ ... ] make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the 
State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an 
effective appeal on those grounds"). Here, the minute order is so limited that it cannot 
possibly substitute for a transcript. While it is possible that, following the sentencing 
recommendations by counsel, Mr. Burrola merely commented on the weather, it is much 
more reasonable to conclude that Mr. Burrola's "comments" pertained to his sentence. 
Further, as discussed below, Mr. Burrola presented evidence in his Rule 35 motion that 
he took full responsibility for his crime in his domestic violence classes. (R., pp.151-
162.) Idaho courts have recognized that some leniency is required when a defendant 
expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. See, e.g., 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 
(Ct. App. 1991). Because the minute order does not describe the content of 
Mr. Burrola's testimony at his sentencing hearing, it is unknown whether he took full 
responsibility for his crime at sentencing or whether he blamed others. Therefore, the 
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question of whether the fact that Mr. Burrola took responsibility for his crime is a new 
mitigating factor can only be answered by reviewing a transcript of the sentencing 
hearing. 
Obviously, Mr. Burrola is not required, in his Motion to Augment, to state 
specifically what was said at the sentencing hearing because such detail would require 
reviewing the transcript that is being requested. The Court in its decision in Brunet 
could not have intended to place an indigent defendant in such a paradoxical situation. 
Mr. Burrola provided the Court with the minute order clearly showing that he presented 
testimony on his own behalf at his sentencing hearing. Such a showing meets the 
Brunet standard of an "appearance or semblance of specific information." 
The statement made by Mr. Burrola at his sentencing hearing is necessary for 
appellate review of the denial of his Rule 35 motion. To determine whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion, "this Court 
conducts an independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Brunet at 4 (citing 
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)) (emphasis added). A statement made by a 
defendant at his sentencing hearing is clearly evidence that was available to the trial 
court, and must, therefore, be made available to the reviewing court. Therefore, 
because Mr. Burrola presented evidence at his sentencing hearing in the form of 
testimony, there is a colorable need for the transcript of the September 3, 2008 
sentencing hearing to be augmented to the record. As such, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision to deny Mr. Burrola's request to augment the record with that transcript 
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Consider The 
Supplemental Information Provided By Mr. Burrola In His Second Addendum To His 
Rule 35 Motion 
Prior to the district court's decision on the Rule 35 motion, Mr. Burrola provided 
additional information for the court to consider. The court's refusal to consider this 
information was unreasonable in light of the fact that the court had not yet ruled on the 
Rule 35 motion and did not actually render a decision until a week later. (R., pp.177-
178.) 
A court abuses its discretion at sentencing when it unreasonably refuses to 
consider relevant evidence or unduly limits the information considered. See, e.g., 
State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984) (court abused its discretion when it 
failed to consider social worker's report when it decided defendant's Rule 35 motion); 
State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1988) (court abused its discretion 
when it refused to hear proffered testimony from jail staff regarding defendant's good 
behavior or from relatives concerning the defendant's alcohol problem and possibility of 
treatment when it decided defendant's Rule 35 motion); compare State v. Ramirez, 122 
Idaho 830, 836 (Ct. App. 1992) (court did not unduly limit the information it considered 
on a Rule 35 motion when it refused to conduct a hearing that would allow the 
defendant to present testimony when defendant could not identify what information he 
might have produced). 
Here, unlike in Ramirez, the court already had the information that it refused to 
consider. The court stated that it did not consider the new information because it was 
not received by the date on which the court said it was going to rule on the motion. 
(R., pp.177-178.) However, the court did not rule on the motion on that date, and 
12 
therefore, the court unduly limited the available information that it considered. The court 
did not present a single explanation for excluding the supplemental information other 
that the fact that it "could have made a ruling on the motion" prior to the receipt of the 
information. (R., p.178.) The supplemental information constituted a total of six pages 
and was not burdensome for the court to read. (R., pp.170-176.) Letters of support 
from family members and proof of enrollment in treatment programs are clearly relevant 
to sentencing. As such, the court's decision to not consider this information was 
unreasonable and, therefore, an abuse of discretion. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 Motion In 
Light Of The Supplemental Information Provided In His Original Addendum To His 
Rule 35 Motion 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to consider the 
supplemental information that Mr. Burrola provided in his Second Addendum to his Rule 
35 motion, the court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion in 
light of the new and additional information that it did review. 
An otherwise lawful sentence may be altered under Rule 35 if the sentence 
originally imposed was unduly severe." State v. Trent, supra, 125 Idaho 251, 253 
(Ct. App. 1994). Even if the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, a 
defendant can prevail on a Rule 35 motion if the sentence is excessive in view of new or 
additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. "The criteria for 
examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. In order to challenge 
the denial of a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must have presented new or additional 
information with the motion for reduction. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
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Mr. Burrola asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 10 
years, with 2 years fixed, was excessive in light of the new information he provided in 
his Rule 35 motion. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an 
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of 
the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 
772 (Ct. App. 1982). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is 
within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of 
discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 
293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Burrola does 
not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to 
show an abuse of discretion, he must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
Here, Mr. Burrola provided the court with progress reports from his 
Pathways Program from September 2009 through July 2010. (R., pp.151-162.) The 
reports were extremely positive and showed that Mr. Burrola took his domestic violence 
classes seriously. Prior to these classes, Mr. Burrola had never received treatment for 
drug and alcohol abuse or for domestic violence. (2008 Presentence Investigation 
Report, p.15, 2008 PSI generally.) The reports state that Mr. Burrola had excellent 
empathy and concern, that he gave and received feedback thoughtfully, that he 
completed all of his homework assignments with evidence of thought and effort, he was 
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attentive and took notes during presentations, and that he "took responsibility for his 
crime 100%." (R., pp.151-162.) One facilitator, Deby Stace, said that "it is apparent 
that [Mr. Burrola] is cognitively taking the material in and is contemplating how to apply 
the material." (R., pp.156.) There is not a single negative statement regarding 
Mr. Burrola's progress in nearly a year of domestic violence counseling. (R., pp.151-
162.) Although Mr. Burrola later admitted to violating his probation, it should be noted 
that none of the allegations in either of his probation violations involved violence or 
domestic dispute of any kind. (R., pp.111-113, 124-126.) These classes had not 
occurred at the time of sentencing and, therefore, these reports were not available to 
the district court when it imposed Mr. Burrola's original sentence. Clearly, Mr. Burrola 
learned from the classes and, as such, presents much less of a danger to the public 
than he did when he was first sentenced. His progress also shows his amenability to 
rehabilitation. Mr. Burrola may not have been perfect on probation, but he made 
progress, as evidenced by the reports, and the court abused its discretion by not 
reducing his underlying sentence when it revoked probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Burrola respectfully requests access to the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing and the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing once the 
record is complete. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Burrola respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate the order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case with 
an order that the court consider the improperly excluded information. Alternatively, he 
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
KIMBERLY SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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